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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is established under §78-2-2 (3) (f) Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended) which gives the Supreme Cc^ urt jurisdiction to 
review all final orders and decrees of the district court. This 
case is subject to assignment to the Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAIf 
Appellants have stated nine issues on appeal which these 
Appellees believe can be succinctly summarized as follows: 
1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED Itf HOLDING THAT THE 
SEPTEMBER 1987 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DID NOT RELEASE OTHERWISE VALID 
LIENS SECURING UNPAID NOTES, EITHER BY CONTRACT INTERPRETATION OR 
BY OPERATION OF LAW. 
This question represents a mixed questibn of fact and law. 
Insofar as the question involves the intent of the parties to 
preserve the lien on the property, it is $ question of fact. 
Therefore, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, the 
finding will not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (as amended, effective January 1, 1987); 
Grayson Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinsoq, 782 P.2d 487 (Utah 
1989) . 
Insofar as the question is one of law involving contract 
interpretation and the operation of law, the appropriate standard 
of review is no particular deference, but the Lower court decision 
should be reviewed for its correctness. Scha^rf v. BMG Corp., 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Ut. 1985). 
2. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS VALUATION OF CERTAIN 
PROPERTIES. 
This issue presents a question of fact; therefore, the 
standard of review is whether the lower court's ruling was clearly 
erroneous. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellants Overthrust Oil and Gas Company (hereinafter 
"Overthrust") and Faust Land, Inc. (hereinafter "Faust") are 
appealing a decision of the Third Judicial District Court allowing 
the judicial foreclosure of a Trust Deed covering undeveloped 
acreage in Tooele County, Utah. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
A non-jury trial was held before the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson on Thursday, August 31, 1989, in Tooele, Utah. 
Subsequent to the trial, the District Court made Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law which were executed by the Court on 
October 23, 1989. In its decision, the Court ruled in Plaintiffs1 
favor, holding that Plaintiffs may proceed with a judicial 
foreclosure of the Tooele County property which is the subject of 
this case. 
The Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law delayed 
for future determination the issue of the amount of "boot" to be 
credited to the Promissory Note which is the subject of this 
action. A heeiring was held on Monday, November 13, 1989, wherein 
the Court considered this issue and subsequently considered a 
proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Counsel for Defendants Overthrust "and Faust objected to the same. 
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A hearing on the objections was held by the Court on February 8, 
1990. 
Pursuant to such hearing, the District Cc>urt made Superseding 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law whiich were intended to 
supersede all previous Findings and Conclusions. In the 
Superseding Findings of Fact and Conclusion^ of Law, the Court 
found (1) the promissory note which was secured by a Trust Deed 
from Overthrust was unsatisfied, (2) an amount Df $1,152,115.50 was 
still owed thereon after application of all appropriate credits, 
and (3) the Trust Deed had not been released. The Court therefore 
ordered foreclosure. 
No Defendants posted any Supersedeas Bond. As a result, the 
foreclosure sale was completed on August 14, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTJS 
1. In 1987, three large loans owing to Zions Bank and 
cumulating over seven million dollars went iifto default (R. 433). 
The loans were secured primarily by various parcels of real estate 
in Summit, Salt Lake and Tooele Counties (C0urt Finding of Fact 
Nos. 1-4, 8; R. 435-434, 433). Appellee 4447 Associates had 
earlier acquired an interest in the notes with Zions Bank (Court 
Finding of Fact No. 9; R. 433). 
2. The bank engaged in extensive settlement negotiations 
with the obligors on the notes (Court Finding of Fact No. 11; 
R. 433). A written Settlement Agreement of September 30, 1987, 
resulted from such discussions (Court Finding of Fact No. 12; 
R. 433). 
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3. The obligors of the notes, realizing that substantial 
deficiency judgments would result following foreclosure of the 
collateral, agreed to the following: 
a. to allow Zions Bank to complete foreclosures of the 
real estate, (Court Finding of Fact No. 12; R. 433); and 
b. to contribute certain other assets ("boot") to the 
bank in exchange for the bank's agreement to release the 
obligors from further personal liability on the notes. (Court 
Finding of Fact Nos. 12, 14(a) - (3); R. 433, 432). 
4. Appellants Overthrust and Faust Land Inc. were not makers 
on the notes (Court Finding of Fact No. 5; R. 4 34) but claimed some 
ownership to approximately 3,500 acres of undeveloped real property 
located in Tooele County, which property was pledged as collateral 
on one of the loans in default with the bank. Appellant Faust Land 
Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Appellant Overthrust (Court 
Finding of Fact Nos. 4, 10; R. 434, 433). 
5. Overthrust and Faust Land Inc., while not direct parties 
to the September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement (Court Finding of 
Fact No. 13; R. 432) , actively participated through their President 
in the settlement negotiations (Court Finding of Fact No. 15; 
R. 431), knew the consequences of the decisions reached (Court 
Finding of Fact No. 15; R. 431), never objected to the same, and 
cooperated in effectuating the terms of the Settlement Agreement 
(Court Finding of Fact Nos. 15, 17, 18; R. 431). In addition, 
ownership of Overthrust and other entities who were parties to the 
September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement was substantially similar 
(Court Finding of Fact No. 6; R. 434-433). 
6. Following the execution of the Settlement Agreement, 
Zions Bank and the note obligors began to complete the terms 
thereof. The "boot" assets were delivered to the bank in trust and 
the bank began finalizing the foreclosure^ of the collateral 
securing the notes. (R. 481, pages 236, 207+-208.) 
7. Much of the collateral was foreclosed pursuant to sales 
in the Utah Bankruptcy Court which were ordered pursuant to the 
September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement. (R. 481, page 236). 
8. The final parcel of property to be foreclosed pursuant to 
the September 1987 Settlement Agreement was t|he 3 500 acres located 
in Tooele County to which Appellants claimed some interest. 
(R. 481, page 236) 
9. Pursuant to the September 30, 1987, (Settlement Agreement, 
the President of Overthrust verbally agreed to execute a deed in 
lieu of foreclosure to the bank. (Court Finding of Fact No. 17; 
R. 431). Subsequently, he suggested a "friendly foreclosure" would 
be preferable, with the intent that Overthrust would not contest 
the same (Court Finding of Fact No. 18; R. 4j31) . Pursuant to its 
reservation of right in the September 1987 Settlement Agreement, 
the bank then initiated the instant action to judicially foreclose 
its trust deed lien on the Tooele collateral. (Court Conclusion of 
Law No. 3; R. 428). 
10. Contrary to the representations of its President, 
Overthrust (and Faust Land Inc.) then contested the appropriateness 
of the action, claiming: 
a. That despite its reservation of rights in the 
Settlement Agreement, the release of liability to the obligors 
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somehow satisfied the note and extinguished the Tooele 
collateral. 
b. Alternatively, the amounts received on foreclosure 
of collateral securing the other notes, when added to the 
"boot" received by the bank, have in effect "overpaid" the 
note in question and thereby satisfied the same. The Tooele 
collateral, it is claimed, should thereby be released from its 
lien to the bank. No claim is apparently asserted that the 
trust deed was invalid and hadn't been a lien on the property, 
but only that it is no longer enforceable. 
11. At trial, the Court held that: 
a. The release of liability to the note obligors did 
not release the collateral from the valid bank lien. The bank 
had reserved its rights to complete the foreclosures under the 
September 1987 Settlement Agreement. (Court Conclusion of Law 
Nos. 9, 17; R. 427, 425). 
b. That after application of all appropriate credits 
(including "boot") to the note secured by the Tooele property, 
the balance owing on such note was $1,152,115.50 at the time 
of trial (Court Conclusion of Law No. 14; R. 426). 
c. That foreclosure be completed (Court Conclusion of 
Law Nos. 9, 21, 22; R. 427, 425). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement did not "satisfy" 
the three delinquent notes owed to Zions Bank, nor did it release 
valid liens against collateral securing the notes. The Settlement 
Agreement simply released obligors of the notes from further 
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liability thereon, all while explicitly reserving the bankfs right 
to foreclose on such collateral. 
The trial court, as finder of fact, cporrectly valued all 
relevant property and still determined that tt^ e Tooele property was 
subject to a note with an unpaid balance of $1,152,115.50. 
The provisions of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, by its 
very terms, do not apply to a transaction involving the foreclosure 
of real estate. Even if such provisions did ftpply, Overthrust was 
not an accommodation party. 
The one-action rule was not violated, but instead was 
followed, in the foreclosures completed pursuant to the 
September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement. 
Contrary to the assertions of Appellants! that the bank should 
have tried to "rescind" the September 30, 1^87, Agreement if the 
bank wasn't happy with its terms, the bank has never wanted to 
rescind the agreement. All the bank wants i|s what the agreement 
provides—nothing more and nothing less. The Settlement Agreement 
provided for the bank to complete its foreclosure of the Tooele 
property. That is what the bank did. The district court 
considered Appellant's arguments and rejectee^ the same. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE SEPTEMBER 30, 1987, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS VALID AND DID 
NOT "SATISFY" NOR "EXTINGUISH" THE UNPAID PROMISSORY NOTES, 
A. Intent of Settlement Agreement Itself. 
Appellants argue that by releasing the obligors from further 
liability on the notes, there is no more ijiote. Consequently, 
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Appellants argue, the collateral securing the notes must be 
released. 
Such recisoning is contrary to the express terms of the 
September 30, 1987, Settlement Agreement, 
The Settlement Agreement did not "satisfy" nor "extinguish" 
the unpaid notes. Such words are not found in the agreement. 
Instead, the intent and language of the agreement was to release 
contingent personal liability of the note obligors while expressly 
reserving the right to foreclose the collateral securing the notes. 
The agreement states: 
"Upon the transfer and recordation of the documents 
required herein, . . . Lenders specifically 
acknowledge that Borrowers' and Christenson's 
personal obligations under such Loans will be 
terminated and Lenders1 sole remedy shall be 
against the real properties which are the subject 
of this Agreement." 
Settlement Agreement, page 8 (First Exhibit to Addendum to 
Appellants1 Brief). If the parties had intended to "satisfy" the 
notes, they would not have reserved the right to liquidate the 
collateral. 
Finally, Appellants never allege the other foreclosures 
pursuant to the Settlement Agreement were invalid—instead, 
Appellants rely upon such sales to argue the notes were overpaid. 
It is inconsistent to argue that the 1987 Settlement Agreement 
satisfied notes and released all collateral, while next arguing 
that all resulting foreclosures were valid but the one affecting 
the Tooele property. 
It is obvious that the 1987 Settlement Agreement did not 
satisfy the unpaid notes, nor extinguish the collateral security to 
the same. 
B. Validity of Settlement Agreement. 
It is unclear from Appellant's brief whether the validity of 
the Settlement Agreement is being challenged. Its validity was 
never challenged in the district court; therefore, it may not be 
challenged now. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P|.2d 938 (Ut. 1987). 
Appellees Zions Bank and 4447 Associates 4° n o t challenge the 
validity of the Agreement, but only want th0 terms therein to be 
completed. 
Appellant's brief appears to challenge the validity of the 
Settlement Agreement for the reason that foreclosure of the Tooele 
property was not possible in the Bankruptcy C|ourt at the same time 
as the other properties. This was not possible because the 
Bankruptcy Court did not have jurisdiction over the Tooele 
property. (R. 431, R. 481, pages 234-235) . Hjowever the Settlement 
Agreement contemplated such a situation and provided that if an 
order of sale from the Bankruptcy Court was hot possible then the 
property would be foreclosed under the laws of the state. 
(Settlement Agreement, See first Exhibit to Addendum to Appellants1 
Brief, page 8.) Therefore, all parties hav^ been able to comply 
fully with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 
C. Validity of Trust Deed Itself. 
It is also unclear from Appellant's briei} whether the validity 
of the trust deed is being challenged. Because it was not 
challenged in the district court, it may not be challenged now. 
Mascaro, 741 P. 2d 938. However, should it be found to be an issue, 
the following general rules are relevant and validate the Trust 
Deed. 
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A mortgage is a contract and as such it is governed by the 
same laws which apply to the interpretation of contracts. 
Therefore, fl[t]he consideration required to sustain a mortgage is 
the same as that required to sustain a simple contract, and may 
consist of either a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the 
promisor." Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel Mortuary, Inc., 514 
P.2d 594, 598 (Id. 1973); Abraham v. Abraham. 394 P.2d 385 (Ut. 
1964). In Surety Life, the court held that a mortgage was valid 
even though the mortgagor did not receive the consideration. In 
Seattle-First Nat. Bank, v. Hart, 573 P.2d 827, 829 (Wa.App. 1978), 
the Court found a co-owner's interest in real property could be 
foreclosed even though it didn't sign the note because it did sign 
the mortgage. 
In order to have a valid trust deed no particular form is 
necessary, but there must be in existence a legal debt or 
obligation with a specific amount owing. General Glass Corp. v. 
Mast Const. Co., 766 P.2d 429, 432 (Ut.App. 1988). 
Further, the debt need not be for any consequential amount, 
there need only be some debt. In American Savings and Loan Ass'n 
v. Blomauist, 445 P.2d 1, 4 (Ut. 1968), a tender of $147 was found 
insufficient to defeat foreclosure when the amount of indebtedness, 
as determined by the court because there was a dispute, was $149. 
Id. 
In the present case, the Trust Deed is valid because it was 
supported by adequate consideration (R. 434-433) and it correctly 
identified the debt which it was intended to secure (R. 428) . The 
district court found that even after all the pledged security and 
a percentage of the "boot" were applied to the balance of the 
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Promissory Note it was still unsatisfied and in default. (R. 426, 
430) . 
II. THE RELEASE OF THE OBLIGORS FROM FURTHER [PERSONAL LIABILITY ON 
THE NOTES DID NOT "RELEASE" THE VALID COLLATERAL SECURING THE 
NOTES. 
A. The Parties to the Settlement Agreement Specifically 
Reserved Their Rights Against the Collateral. 
It is a long-standing rule of law that "[t]he debt and the 
mortgagor's liability for it are not the same thing in law. Hence 
the mortgage is not discharged if it is tjhe intention of the 
parties merely to release the mortgagor's pergonal liability for it 
and not to extinguish the debt." 59 C.J.S. Mortgages, §444 (1983). 
Also, "[i]t is not necessary that there should be a personal 
liability of the mortgagor in order for therle to be a mortgage." 
Seattle First, 573 P.2d at 828-29 and "a mortgage may secure the 
debt of another without the mortgagor assuming personal liability 
for the debt." Gallager v. Central Indiana $ank N.A., 448 N.E.2d 
304, 308 (Ind. 1983). 
Non-recourse loans secured by real estate are common on Utah. 
Further, note obligors are often discharged in bankruptcy without 
releasing collateral securing the "discharged" obligation. The 
1987 Settlement Agreement merely accomplishes the same result. It 
released the obligors of various notes frc^ m further liability 
without releasing the collateral—in effect, leaking the notes "non-
recourse" . 
An express reservation of a right t£> foreclose against 
property which secures a debt while releasing an individual of 
personal liability is valid and enforceable in Utah because the 
note is independent from the underlying debt.. Utah Farm Production 
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Credit Ass'n v. Watts, 737 P.2d 154 (Ut. 1987). "Whether the 
intention in any case is to discharge the debt or merely the 
personal liability is a question of fact, depending on the 
circumstances of the case or the construction of the release." 
Korb v, Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. , 3 P.2d 502, 505 (Kan. 
1931). In Grand Rapids Gypsum Co. v. Carter, 302 F.Supp. (E.D.N.Y. 
1969) the court found evidence that a general release was not 
intended to release a mortgage and therefore, in spite of the 
general wording of the release only the mortgagor's personal 
liability was released. 
Even if an old note is replaced with a new note or agreement, 
this does not affect the security. Jones v. American Coin 
Portfolios, Inc.
 f 709 P. 2d 303 (Ut. 1985) . In Jones the parties to 
a note entered into a new agreement and the mortgagor argued that 
this extinguished the first note and hence the mortgage. However, 
the court found that the evidence indicated that the parties never 
intended to extinguish the mortgage because the original note was 
attached as an exhibit to the new agreement and because the 
indebtedness represented by the original Trust Deed Note or the 
amended Trust Deed Note had never been extinguished. Jones v. 
American Coin, 709 P.2d at 306-307. 
In the case at bar, a Trust Deed was given to secure a third 
party's indebtedness on a note. (R. 4 34) The parties to the 
original note subsequently entered into a new agreement in which 
the debtors were released from personal liability upon the note. 
However, in the agreement, Zions expressly stated that the release 
was only of the debtor's personal liability on the notes and all 
rights against the property which secured the note were expressly 
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reserved. (R. 433-432, R. 425) Additionally|, the Promissory Note 
has never been returned or marked "paid". (R. 481, page 13). 
Because the original debt has never been satisfied (R. 426), and 
the intent of the parties was to only release the debtor's of their 
personal liability on the Promissory Note, j(R. 425) the district 
court correctly determined that Appellees were entitled to 
foreclose the Trust Deed. 
B. The Collateral Securing the Notesj Was Not Released by 
Operation of Law. 
1. Because there has been no violation of Section 
78-37-1 U.C.A. The trial court properly found 
foreclosure to be appropriate. 
Section 78-37-1 U.C.A. has been termed the "one-action 
rule." It provides that: 
There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or 
the enforcement of any right securjed solely by mortgage 
upon real estate which action must be in accordance with 
the provisions of this chapter. 
In Utah Mortgage and Loan Co. v. Bla^k, 618 P.2d 43 (Ut. 
1980), the court explains: 
The purpose of the statute was to eliminate harassment of 
debtors and multiple litigation which sometimes occurred 
under the common-law rule which allowed a creditor to 
foreclose and sell the land and to sue on the note. The 
statute limits the creditor to one remedy in exhausting 
his security before having recourse to the debtor for a 
deficiency. Consequently, if the creditor fails to 
comply with the statute in not applying the security to 
the defendants obligation in accordance with their 
agreement, that would preclude its recovery of any 
deficiency against them. 
Id. at 45. 
Appellants assert that the one-action rjule has been violated 
in this case. The reasoning for such assertion is unclear from 
Appellants f brief. 
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Appellees do not seek any secondary action for deficiency 
judgment against any of the obligors under any of the notes. The 
only relief sought was a foreclosure of the real estate pledged on 
the various notes• All foreclosures were effectuated under a 
common plan pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 
It is also unclear how Appellants have been damaged by the 
process of liquidation of all collateral pledged on the notes. The 
one-action ruLe requires a creditor to exhaust a security prior to 
seeking a personal judgment against an obligor. Such result is 
exactly the situation which occurred as required by statute. No 
deficiency is sought against any party. 
2. The district court correctly determined that 
Overthrust was not an accommodation party and that 
Section 70A-3-606 U.C.A. did not apply. 
Appellees Zions Bank and 4447 Associates incorporate the 
argument in the brief of Appellee Richard A. Christenson by 
reference. 
In addition, the legislature as well as the courts have 
expressly stated that Utah's Uniform Commercial Code is not 
applicable "to the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien 
on real estate ..." Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 460 
(Ut. 1983) (quoting from §70A-9-104(j) U.C.A.) (Court refused to 
apply unconscionability section from Utah's Uniform Commercial Code 
to a Trust Deed). Therefore, Overthrust's arguments relating to 
accommodation parties are irrelevant. 
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III. BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S VALUATION £|ND APPLICATION OF THE 
PROMISSORY NOTE'S SECURITY WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, ON 
REVIEW IT MUST STAND AND FORECLOSURE WAS THEREFORE 
APPROPRIATE. 
A. In General. 
The district court listened to testimony and the issues were 
extensively argued and briefed by counsel forj both parties. While 
another court may have valued the property differently, there is 
evidence to support the findings of the distnict court, and it was 
definitely within the discretion of the distrtict court to make the 
findings of fact which were made. A finding is clearly erroneous 
only if it is against the great weight of evidence or if the court 
is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has 
been made. Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 117£ (Ut. 1989). 
Additionally, in an attack on the evidenlce by appellants, the 
appellate court should begin its analysis w|th the trial court's 
findings of fact, not with an appellant's view of the way he or she 
believes that facts should have been found. Ashton v. Ashton, 733 
P.2d 147 (Ut. 1987). In order to challenge a trial court's 
findings of fact, an appellant must first mar^hall all the evidence 
that supports the findings and then demonstrate that, despite this 
evidence, they are so lacking in support a$ to be "against the 
clear weight of the evidence" and, thus, clealrly erroneous. In re 
Estate of Bartell. 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Ut. 19$9). 
B. Valuation of Overthrust Stock. 
The only valuation issue specifically attacked by Appellants 
is whether the district court clearly erred iji valuing one million 
(1,000,000) shares of Overthrust stock at $2$0,000.00. At trial, 
George Woodhead, President of Appellant Overthrust, gave testimony 
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that the shares were worth two and one half {2\) cents each (or 
$250,000). (R. 481, pages 149-152, 162). Additionally at trial, 
an Option to Purchase between Zions and Overthrust was presented as 
evidence of the value of Overthrust stock. Under the Option to 
Purchase agreement, Zions was granted the option to purchase 
Overthrust stock at ten (10) cents per share. Testimony was also 
given wherein the value of Overthrust stock was shown to be 
substantially less than two and one half (2h) cents per share. (R. 
481, pages 123, 209-220) . Because the value of the stock was hotly 
contested, it was clearly within the discretion of the district 
court to rule that the testimony given by George Woodhead 
(President of Appellant Overthrust) was the best valuation possible 
of the stock under the circumstances. 
C. Application of Credits Due to the Note. 
To reach the conclusion that the note was unpaid and 
foreclosure was appropriate, the district court credited the value 
of all security which had specifically been pledged to the 
Promissory Note. (R. 427-426). In addition, the district court 
applied, on a pro-rata basis, the value of certain other security 
("boot") which Zions was to receive from the Settlement Agreement 
of September 30, 1987. (R. 427-426). Even after all these credits 
were accounted for, the Promissory Note was still unsatisfied 
(R. 426), with an unpaid balance of $1,152,115.50. Therefore, 
foreclosure of the Tooele property was appropriate. 
Appellants1 brief seeks to complicate the district court's 
ruling by engaging in an analysis of speculative values of all 
property pledged on other notes as well as the "boot11 received by 
Appellants pursuant to the September 30, 1987, Settlement 
Agreement. It also raises valuations of property never raised in 
the district court and first raised in Appellant's brief. 
Evidence and new arguments may not be submitted for the first 
time on appeal, particularly when the problem could have been 
resolved by the court below. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Ut. 
1987). However, on appeal Overthrust has added credits and made 
arguments for which no evidence was presented at trial. On appeal, 
Overthrust argues that no debt is owed to Ziojns and as support has 
compiled a table wherein credits are allocated to Zions for 
security allegedly received under the Settlement Agreement. 
(Overthrust's Brief, page 29). However, no evidence was presented 
at trial concerning several of the credits; therefore, the 
district court made no findings on these ite^ ns. Overthrust gives 
a credit of $620,000.00 to Zions-4447 for £ "Redwood Road Rear 
Utility Access". There is no evidence concerning this item 
anywhere in the record. Also, $1,422,291.00 is credited to Zions-
4447 for "Reverse of Interest Charges". Th^ argument supporting 
this credit was not presented at trial, nor Is there any evidence 
that this credit was ever presented to the district court for a 
decision on whether it would be allowed. Any cite to the record is 
wholly inadequate and inappropriate to explain Overthrustfs 
assertion that it is entitled to a $1,422|, 491.00 credit. In 
addition to being unsupported by the evidence, the portion of the 
table contained on page 29 of Overthrust!s B^ief which summarizes 
alleged credits to Zions-4447 is irrelevant to the issue in this 
case; namely, whether the Promissory Note secured by the Tooele 
property was satisfied. Because these assertions were never 
presented to the district court for consideration, they may not be 
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considered now. As a result, the findings of the District Court 
must stand. 
Additionally, it was within the sound discretion of the 
district court to allow a credit to the Promissory Note on a pro-
rata basis. In Clovis National Bank v. Harmon, 692 P.2d 1315, 1318 
(N.M. 1984) , a note was secured by two mortgages and the court 
ruled that the note should be satisfied proratably from the sale of 
the mortgaged property. The reviewing court explained that if the 
parties had intended the property to secure only certain notes or 
loans, it could have stated that intent. Because the parties did 
not, the district court refused to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
The Settlement Agreement of September 30, 1987 was valid, 
enforceable and all its terms and conditions may be complied with. 
The Promissory Note, which was secured by a Trust Deed executed by 
Overthrust, has never been satisfied, nor has the Trust Deed been 
released. As a result, foreclosure of the Tooele property was 
properly ordered by the district court. 
Zions Bank and 4447 Associates want no more, and no less, than 
the Settlement Agreement allows. The district court's ruling 
accomplishes such a result and should be upheld. 
nl*~ DATED this '^ day of January, 1991. 
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS 
J. I WUK/ 
Jruce J. Nelson 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Cross-Claim Respondents 
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